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HEALTH EPIDEMIC HITS HOME FOR PROPERTY
INSURERS: PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY V. LILLARD-ROBERTS V.
PRIMOZICH
Vanessa Fosse*

INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the asbestos litigation, scenarios in which property
insurers must concern themselves economically with their insureds'
health remain rare, yet all too familiar.' A new toxin has inched its
way into the homes and bodies of Americans, driving people out of
their homes, insurance companies into a new nightmare, and a myriad
of property insurance disputes into court.2 This article will touch upon
the prevalent issues involved in toxic tort litigation, and examine the
possibilities by which courts may evaluate and respond to a certain type
of toxic mold case. Specifically, this article will examine a toxic mold
case in which the pivotal issues are investigation, cause, coverage, and
the corresponding costs.
Toxic Mold
"Moldy homes have been around since biblical times.",3 Usually the
mold found within homes will only cause problems when the owner is
in fact allergic to the mold.4 However, toxin producing strains of mold
such as Stachybotrys atra, Aspergillus, and Penicillium have been
appearing in homes in recent years causing some homeowners to suffer
*Staff Writer, DePaul Journal of Health Care Law. B.A., Augustana College; J.D.,
DePaul University College of Law, expected 2004.
'Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App.

1997). 2

See generally Dan Michalski, PersonalBusiness; Mold Can Be an InsuranceMess for
Homeowners,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 3, at 9.
3
4

Lisa Belkin, Haunted by Mold, N.Y. TIMES, August 12, 2001, § 6, at 28.
See id.
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from resulting respiratory problems. 5 Stachybotrys atra "is a greenish
black fungus that grows on material with a high cellulose and low
nitrogen content, such as fiberboard, gypsum board, paper, dust, and
lint, that becomes chronically moist or water damaged due to excessive6
humidity, water leaks, condensation, water infiltration, or flooding."
Aspergillus is a fungus that grows within a portion of a damaged lung,
"which was previously damaged during an illness such as tuberculosis
or sarcoidosis." 7 Penicillium is commonly found in food, soil, paint,
wall paper, insulation, and carpet. 8 Penicillium can produce9
mycotoxins, which are dangerous toxins or "literally fungus poisons."
Serious health problems can result when humans ingest or inhale large
quantities of mycotoxins.10
Toxic mold has shown up everywhere in the United States from
factories, schools, courthouses, and libraries, to housing projects and
the grandest of homes." The presence of toxic mold within the home
can cause serious health problems,

" * . . secreting chemicals called

mycotoxins, which can find their way into your body, entering through
your nose, mouth and skin, lodging perhaps in your digestive tract,
your lungs or your brain." 12 These mold toxins within the home
"poison slowly and erratically."' 3 As a result, in 2002, "insurance
companies estimate[d] that more than 10,000 families nationwide
[were] 14forced out of their homes because of toxic mold in the last two
years."'

Mold Litigation
While toxic mold litigation is relatively new, the majority of suits
having developed in the past two or three years, it has become apparent
5

See Michalski, supra note 2; see also Jay Romano, ManagingMold, andLawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES Jan. 26, 2003, § 11, at 5.
6 See CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERV., Stachybotrys chartarum (atra):A mold that may be
at
http://www.cal(Infosheet)
(1997),
in
water-damaged homes
found
iaq.org/LAYMEM97.html.
at
Website,
Aspergillus
Vilar, Aspergillus, The
Dr.
Javier
See
http://www.aspergillus.man.ac.uk/.
8 See Susan Lillard-Roberts, Penicillium, Mold-Help, at http://www.moldhelp.org/pages/submenus/molds/penicillium.htm.
9See Dr. George J. Wong, Discovery of Mycotoxins and Common Examples, at
http://www.botany.hawaii.edu/faculty/wongIbot135/lectll.htm; see also George Barron,
Fungi,
on
Website
George
Barron's
Penicillium,
http://www.uoguelph.ca/-gbarron/MISCELLANEOUS/penicill.htm.
l°See Lillard-Roberts, supra note 8.
Belkin, supra note 3.
"See
121d.
131d.

14See

Michalski, supra note 2.
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that all the parties involved are not exactly sure where to turn for help
or guidance. 15 Meanwhile, homeowners face health problems, the
necessary remedial measures, and in severe cases, the loss of their
home. 16 Insurance companies face complex coverage issues and
policies open to differing interpretations.
Courts face a lack of
precedent in ruling upon these critical mold related issues. Similarly,
courts face the challenge of setting a workable precedent, cognizant of
the major health and economic implications. 18 In light of this
endeavor, it is imperative courts know the claims to expect, evaluate
the young precedent, and assess decisions that are made outside their
own jurisdictions.
While many of the active cases remain pending, an overview of
recent opinions and orders provides ample indication of the breadth of
what is to come.19 In Centex-Rooney Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin
County, a 1997 Florida decision, the District Court of Appeals awarded
Martin County $11,550,000 in damages after it was determined the
faulty construction of its courthouse and the resulting mold caused the
building's occupants' health problems. 20
As sureties of the
construction project, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and
the American Insurance Company were named as co-defendants, and
were required to share in the ramifications of this substantial
trailblazing judgment. 21 A case pending in Texas, Lewis v. State Farm
Lloyds, involves a couple who filed a damage claim under their
insurance policy after they had unknowingly purchased a home
containing toxic mold.22 However, the couple's insurance company
continues to refuse to honor their claim, stating the home was infested
with mold prior to the couple purchasing it. 23 In another case pending
in Texas, the plaintiffs case was severely impaired when the court
determined that their medical expert's opinion regarding allergies to
mold was inadmissible, because it was unreliable under the Daubert
24
principles.
15Id"
'1 d.
17Id.

18See generally Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lillard-Roberts v. Primozich, No.
CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL 31495830, *2 (D. Or. June 18, 2002).
19
20See generally Romano, supra note 5.

Centex-Rooney Constr. Co., Inc. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20, 24-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1997).
2

lid. at 28-29.

22Lewis v. State Farm Lloyds, 205 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. Texas
2002).
23

Id. at 707.
Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702-04 (S.D. Texas 2002);
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., a court must evaluate the following, non24
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A theme of indecision resonates throughout the limited published
opinions and orders as the courts are faced with what may either be
home or business breaking decisions. 25 Aside from the Centex
decision, in which the construction company was found guilty of
negligence and required to pay for the resulting detriment, courts must
deal with two seemingly innocent parties confronting the same
catastrophic economic problem. 26 The question remains, who is going
to pay for the remedial measures required when toxic mold takes over a
family's home? 27 In order to answer that question, decisions and
conclusions are needed to address causation and policy interpretation
issues. 28 However, reaching even these conclusions often requires the
expensive process of deconstructive testing, thus begging the question
of who should be responsible for shouldering these costs.29 In addition,
experts qualified to testify about the health effects of mold are not only
limited in number, they are also limited in the credibility they are
afforded in judicial proceedings.30
PrudentialProperty & Casualty Insurance Company v. LillardRoberts v. Primozich provides insight regarding the claims that may be
expected from both the insurance companies and the homeowners in
cases to come, as well as a prelude to the impending analysis that will
be required of courts.3 1
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUAL TY INSURANCE
COMPANY V. LILLARD-ROBERTS V. PRIMOZICH
Prudentialrepresents what will likely become the quintessential toxic
mold case, in which the insured and insurer battle over coverage
issues. 32 Named as one of the defendants, Primozich is the insurance

exhaustive list of factors in determining whether an expert's testimony is reliable: 1) whether
the theory or technique proffered can be tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has been the
subject of publication or peer review; 3) the scientific standards and controls in place; 4) the
potential rate of error inherent in the theory or technique; and 5) whether the scientific
community has generally accepted the theory or technique offered by the expert. 509 U.S. 579,
593-9425(1993).
See generally Flores, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 702-04; Centex-Rooney, 706 So.2d at 24-28;

Lewis, 26205 F. Supp. at 707.
27

Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 24-28.

See generally Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.
28
Id.
29
Id"
30
Flores, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04.
31
See, Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.
32
1d.
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33
agent who sold Lillard-Roberts her homeowner's insurance policy.
This opinion is remarkable in the sense that it covers the majority of
issues and claims that are likely to appear in mold cases to come.34 The
Prudential decision is more noteworthy in that, despite ruling on
various motions and eliminating several claims, the court leaves the
insured in a position where it is as though they may have been just as
well, if not better off, uninsured.35
The chain of events that led to the Prudentialcase began in 1998,
when Lillard-Roberts purchased an early twentieth century Victorian
home located in the northwest comer of Oregon. 36 Shortly thereafter,
she purchased a Prudential homeowner's insurance policy for
"maximum coverage" from Prudential agent, Primozich.37 The policy
provided "coverage of $158,000 for the dwelling, $15,800 for other
structures, and $100,600 for personal property., 38 In November 1999,
Lillard-Roberts first noticed water damage to her home, and presented a
claim to Prudential's agent, Primozich.
Primozich denied this
original claim, and asserted that Lillard-Roberts was not covered for the
damage without making any further inquiry or investigation. 40 The
following November, Lillard-Robert's home incurred additional water
damage when the plumbing failed and flooded the ground floor.41
Once again, the claim was denied without further inquiry. 42 Prior to
January 2001, Lillard-Roberts and her family vacated their home on the
advice of a mold expert and her doctor, who attributed her systemic
fungal disease to living in her home.43
Prudential received a claim from Lillard-Roberts for damages to
her home resulting from water, mold, and the resulting mycotoxin
contamination on January 13, 2001. 44 On this occasion, a series of
investigations ensued.45 The February 13, 2001, report of Prudential's
independent adjuster indicated that "'there were active colonies of mold
growing' on the garage roof," and that there was "probably some mold

33
34Id.

at *2.

1d.

35
1d.
36

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *2.

37
Id.
38

1d. at *3.

39
Id.
40

1d.
4'Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *3.
42
Id
43Id.
44Id.
4'Id. at *3-4.
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in the house.", 46 Prudential's mold remediation specialist's report of
March 28, 2001 stated, "mold contamination and possible growth has
occurred in the home, likely resulting from water infiltration into
ceiling areas from chronic roof leaks . . ."47 Talbott Associates Inc.,
hired by Prudential to determine the cause of the mold, opined that the
mold "was 'probably the result of inadequate flashing or flashing
installation,' and... 'inadequately maintained tile grouting inside [the]
shower unit.' '48 A final fungi study was performed by Wise Steps, Inc.
at Prudential's request. 49 It revealed that "visible fugal growth was
found in three water damaged areas caused by leaks in the roof and/or
skylight and shower, 'although there [was] no testing or data to show
that toxins [were] present.' 50
Lillard-Roberts had testing of the home conducted as well.5' On
April 17, 2001, Charles McConnell from the American Management
Associates, L.L.C., a mold remediation firm, discovered "four types of
marker toxigenic mycotoxin producing fungi in the home at levels
elevated far above the outdoor level." 52 McConnell determined that
"the mold appeared to be caused by undetermined roof and shower
leaks." 53 In light of his discoveries, and Lillard-Roberts' diagnosis
with systemic fungal disease, McConnell also "recommended further
investigation to determine the origin and effects of the exposure and
that the family should not return to the home." 54 Southern Cascade
Construction was hired by Lillard-Roberts to ascertain the extent of
damage the home had incurred. 55
Southern Cascade provided an
estimate of "$127,000 based on what could be seen without removing
drywall, ceilings and flooring. , ' 56 Another construction consultant,
Ronald N. Eakin, stated that "the house may be a total loss. 57
Lillard-Roberts also submitted the affidavit of an insurance expert,
which asserted that Prudential's adjuster deviated from the insurance

46Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *3.
47
/d.

4'/d. at *4.
49

Id.

50

d"

51

521d.
53

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *4.

1d.

54

5 51d. at *34.

1d.

561d "
57,d.
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industry's standard practices in making his assessment and conclusion
regarding the cause of the water damage and toxic mold.58
In response to Prudential's request for a completed "Proof of
Loss" form dated February 21, 2001, Lillard-Roberts initially returned
a reiteration of her policy outlining its coverage.5 9 Upon Prudential's
second
request
for
the
completed
"Proof
of
Loss"
form, Lillard-Roberts returned "a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss
dated August 16, 2001, together with photographs of the damage,"
even though she was unable to ascertain the exact60cause, or extent of
the damages, for lack of additional invasive testing.
The Parties' Claims
Prudentialmay be unique because it is a case in which the insurance
company sought declaratory relief, indicating that its policy did not
cover the damage to Lillard-Robert's home. 61
The bases of
Prudential's claims represent its reasons for denying Lillard-Robert's
insurance policy claims, these claims include: there was no direct
physical loss, the insurance policy excludes property damage from
water and sewage backup, the insurance policy excludes property
damage resulting from faulty workmanship, the damage to the personal
property was not caused by any named peril, the insurance policy
excludes damage to personal property caused by rain, and a proof of
loss was not timely submitted.
Lillard-Robert's answer to Prudential's claims included ten
affirmative defenses, "including invalidity of certain exclusions under
ORS 742.246, coverage through promissory estoppel or reformation,
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach
of the standard practices of the insurance industry, and unclean hands
and/or unconscionability. ' ' 63 In addition, Lillard-Roberts responded
with six counterclaims, including: fraud and misrepresentation,
specifically post-claim misrepresentations as to lack of coverage, and
pre-claim misrepresentations to induce purchase of the policy,
outrageous conduct, breach of contract, negligence, declaratory relief,
and reformation. 64

58

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *5.

59
60Idat

*4.
1d at *5-6.

6t

Idat *1.

62

1d.
63
Prudential, 2002 WL 31495830 at *1.
64Id.
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Each of the parties' claims represents the bases and spectrum of
those that might be expected in cases to come, as there are over "10,000
' 65
mold-related lawsuits pending in state courts across the country."
Therefore, evaluation of the District Court of Oregon's analysis of the
claims within this case provides insight into the method of analysis to
be expected from future courts dealing with mold claims. In addition,
the court's analysis allows for hypotheses regarding the deviation of
holdings/orders based upon the nuances of various state laws.
The District Court of Oregon's Prudential Analysis
Lillard-Robert's Claims
The Prudential opinion and Order followed Prudential's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Lillard-Robert's Motion to Stay Consideration
of Prudential's Motion for Summary Judgment and for Leave to
Conduct Destructive Testing on Defendant's Residence at Prudential's
expense.66 Lillard-Roberts argued that prior to summary judgment, she
should have been permitted to obtain documents and depositions "...
on at least two issues: (1) the actual, as opposed to the possible or
probable, cause of the water damage that has led to the growth of the
mold; and (2) whether she failed to cooperate in submitting her proof of
loss, thereby justifying Prudential to declare a forfeiture of her rights
under the policy."
The court, satisfied that the undisputed evidence
and the relevant law provided enough information to rule on several of
the issues, evaluated and dismissed Lillard-Robert's first (fraud and
misrepresentation), second (outrageous conduct), and fourth
(negligence) counterclaims, as well as her third affirmative defense
(promissory estoppel).68
In regards to Lillard-Robert's fraud and misrepresentation
counterclaim, alleging Prudential's agent, Primozich, engaged in
fraudulent and misrepresentative tactics in selling the subject policy,
the court determined "[a] tort-based counterclaim, such as
misrepresentation, cannot stand because it is nothing more than a
dispute over coverage under the policy." 69 The outrageous conduct
counterclaim was also dismissed on grounds that "a tort claim cannot
be based on a contractual relationship." 7o Similarly, the court
"

65

Romano, supra note 5.

66

prudential, 2002 WL 31495830 at *5.
67
681d.

Id at *22-4.

69

Id at *16.
Id at *17.

70
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dismissed the negligence counterclaim stating, "[a]n injured contracting
party may only sue for negligence 'if the other party is subject to a
standard of care independent of the terms of the contract."' 71 The court
dismissed each of the foregoing tort-based claims because it found "...
there was no special or heightened duty 72for Prudential above and
beyond the terms of the insurance contract.,
Lillard-Robert's third affirmative defense asserted "claims are
either covered by the insurance policy, or should be deemed covered
under the doctrine of estoppel or reformation because [Prudential]
failed to provide the insurance coverage requested by [Lillard-Roberts],
and which [Prudential] led [Lillard-Roberts] to reasonably believe
would be provided., 73 The court dismissed this affirmative defense in
light of the fact that "the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the general
rule that estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an
insurance policy," as well as the fact that an insured cannot succeed
under an estoppel theory based on the vague assertions of their
insurance agent.74 While the "reasonable expectations doctrine" varies
from state to state regarding what the insured can expect to be covered
under their policy based upon the assertions of their insurance agent, a
similar affirmative defense asserted elsewhere may survive summary
judgment. A contrary ruling on the estoppel or reformation claims may
be possible under the law of other states if they will allow alteration of
the plain, unambiguous meaning of insurance contracts in order to
fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured. 7 However, the
majority of courts only resort to the reasonable expectations doctrine
upon encountering ambiguous policy language.76 On the other hand,
some courts have flatly rejected adopting the reasonable expectations
doctrine.77
Prudential'sClaims
The Prudential court denied summary judgment for each of
Prudential's claims. 78 The following claims were denied summary
judgment for reasons indicated in Lillard-Robert's Motion to Stay, as
7

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at * 18 (quoting Georgetown Realty Inc. v. Home Ins.
Ore. 97, 106 (Ore. 1992).
Co., 313
72
1d.

73

Id at *22.
74
1d at *22.
75

See e.g., Dibble v. Sec. of Am. Life Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
See e.g., Wolf Mach. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 183 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Cal. Ct. App.

76

1982). 77
See e.g.,
Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387 (Idaho 1979).
78
Prudential, 2002 WL 31495830 at *7-12.
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the cause and origin of the mold remained speculative and
inconclusive: there was no direct physical loss, the insurance policy
excludes property damage resulting from water and sewage backup, the
insurance policy excludes property damage resulting from faulty
workmanship, the damage to the personal property was not caused by
any named peril, and the insurance policy excludes damage to personal
property caused by rain.79 In addition, summary judgment was denied
in the claim which asserted that the proof of loss was not timely
submitted. 80 The denial was based upon the fact that Lillard-Roberts
had cooperated by submitting the "Proof of Loss" form to the best of
her ability. 81 At first blush, the court's conclusions regarding
Prudential's claims appear to be a partial, or temporary, victory for
Lillard-Roberts; however, the implications of the court's denial of
Lillard-Robert's Motion to Stay Consideration for Leave to Conduct
Destructive Testing at Prudential's Expense may negate this triumphant
notion. While Oregon law imposes the "limited" burden of proving
physical loss in order to recover under an "all risks" property insurance
policy, the burden
of proof in such mold cases is not all that limited or
82
inexpensive.
The crux of mold litigation lies in this "limited" burden of proof.
Toxic mold, as a relatively elusive contaminant, usually lurks behind
the walls, ceilings, and other inaccessible places within the home it
infects. 83 As such, the deconstructive investigation and testing requires
devastation of all, or some, of the home before their can be conclusive
84
proof.
Opinion Analysis
Prudential is relatively unique in that the parties did not dispute
whether or not Lillard-Robert's home was actually contaminated with
toxic mold. Throughout the series of investigations, including those
performed at the request of Prudential and Lillard-Roberts, only
Prudential's investigation by Talbott Associates definitively concluded
that the Lillard-Roberts home did not have dangerously unhealthy
levels of mold. 86 Prudential's other investigators did not confirm or
79
Id. at
80
8 Id at

*5-10.
*11-12.
lId at *11-12.
82
Id at *5-7.
83

See Belkin, supra note 3.

84

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *5-6. See also, Michalski, supra note 2.
Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *3-4.
86
1d. at *4.
85
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deny whether the level of mold contamination in the Lillard-Roberts
home had reached unhealthy, uninhabitable levels. 87 However, the
adverse health effects resulting from mold contamination within the
Lillard-Roberts home were made clear when Lillard-Robert's was
diagnosed with "systemic fungal disease," a condition her physician
attributed to living in her home. 88 As a result, the Prudentialcourt was
not required to evaluate the merits of competing expert opinions
regarding the presence of mold or the health effects of mold. 8V The
presence of toxic mold and the adverse health effects it had on LillardRobert's health remained undisputed. 90 Thus, the parties came before
the court with competing claims disputing only cause and naturally the
associated coverage issues. 91 While the majority of state law, as well
as the majority of insurance policies, require the insured prove the loss
was caused by a covered peril, the Prudentialcourt's conclusion seems
objectively reasonable at first glance. 92 However, typically when a
court requires deconstructive testing. in order to substantiate the
insured's case, it does not require the demolition, or near demolition of
a home. 93 Therefore, the Prudential court's conclusion does not
represent a favorable resolution for Lillard-Roberts considering the
breadth of destruction that must necessarily ensue.9 4
The Prudentialcourt left Lillard-Roberts with several theories of
recovery. 95 Lillard-Roberts could attempt to prove that the toxic mold
contamination represented a direct physical loss, contrary to
87

Id. at *34.
*3.
1d.

88
89Id. at
90
1d.
9t
92See

generally Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.
See e.g., Hudson v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 450 So.2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. App. 1984) (holding that insured must establish loss is within the terms of all risk policy,
then burden shifts to insurer to prove that loss arose from cause which is an exception to the all
risks policy.); Wexler Knitting Mills v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(finding that under all risks policy, insured is placed with burden of showing that the loss
actually occurred; following such, burden is on insurer to show such loss is excluded under the
all risks policy.); Reynolds v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 799 (Ark. 1993) (holding that
following insured's prima facie case for coverage under policy, insurer has burden of proving
damages fall under policy exclusion; however, insurer only has such burden if it defends itself
by claiming
insured's damages fall under exclusion of coverage under the all risks policy).
93
See e.g., Driggin v. Am. Sec. Alarm Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 113 (D. Me. 2000) (involving
proposed deconstructive testing of split boil.); U. S. ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 100 F.Supp.2d
619 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (involving deconstructive testing of allegedly defective helicopter
transmission gears.); M-Square Theaters, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 3582
(KTD), 1993 WL 42231 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1993) (involving proposed deconstructive testing
of concrete
used in building a portion of a movie theatre).
94
See generallyPrudential,2002 WL 31495830.
95
Id. at * 1, 24.
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Prudential's claims, 96 or she could try to prove, that the toxic mold
contamination was the result of damage caused by a peril named within
her property insurance policy with Prudential, thus disproving all or a
portion of Prudential's remaining claims. 97 However, as discussed
above, each of these theories requires proof by way of deconstructive
testing of the Lillard-Robert's home. 98 Thus, Lillard-Roberts would be
forced to risk the loss of her home in an attempt to recover under her
99
policy, a policy she clearly assumed would cover her for such a loss.
As noted earlier, toxic mold cases resemble the asbestos litigation
in several respects.100 Each of these toxins has invaded homes, causing
deleterious health effects to the homes' inhabitants. 1 1 Each of these
toxins has required unique proof with respect to property insurance
policies covering "direct physical loss.',102

Courts were required to

grapple with the concept of "direct physical loss" without a visibly
obvious "direct physical loss" in the asbestos cases.'103 However, in the
asbestos cases, the adverse health effects were the result of the
production of a product deliberately placed in homes.' 0 4 The cause for
the inhabitants' ailments in the asbestos cases, although unintended,
0 5
could be traced back to a product, and similarly a manufacturer.'
With toxic mold, nature is the manufacturer, and the "[p]roblem is, you
can't really prevent mold damage or adequately price it."' 1 6 In light of
the foregoing observations, it seems that courts, such as the Prudential
court, need to provide insured parties with an alternative solution to
their mold problems. 1° 7 Requiring the insured to destroy their own
home seems like a drastic and economically unsound proposition,
especially considering that the Prudentialcourt has failed to exhaust
alternative possibilities.' 0 8 As toxic mold presents new health and legal
96

Id. at * 1.

97

1d. at *1 (proving the damage was not the result of water or sewage backup or faulty
workmanship; proving the damage to personal property was not caused by any named peril or
the result of rain damage.).
98
Id. at *24.
99

Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *2-3, 24.
See e.g., Sentinel, 563 N.W.2d 296; Cf Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.

00

'011d.

1021d0

103See e.g., Sentinel 563 N.W.2d 296, 300 (direct physical loss does not require structural
damage, and may be the result of mere injury, rather than complete destruction).
104
Sentinel 563 N.W.2d 296.
1051d.
106See, Tom Berry, Attack of the toxic spores: Mold hits headlines,
ATL. Bus. CHRON.,
Aug. 30, 2002, at http://atlanta.bizjourmals.com/atlantalstories/2002/09/02/focus4.html.
07

See generally Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.
1d.

08
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problems, toxic 9mold litigation may require that courts entertain new
legal solutions.0
PROPOSAL
As stated earlier, toxic mold presents courts with new and challenging
issues.' 10 Therefore, it may be necessary to formulate a new approach
to remediation. Some toxic mold cases present a dispute regarding the
existence of toxic mold within the home, as well as a dispute regarding
whether the insureds' health problems are in fact the result of toxic
mold within the home."' Such "[t]oxic tort cases require proof of both
general and specific causation about the effects of the toxic
substance."" 12 Moreover, in the new arena of the toxic mold litigation,
courts facing disputes regarding the health concerns associated with
toxic mold have difficult Daubert issues to assess.113 Cases such as
Prudential can be distinguished from those involving disputes
regarding the existence and health effects of toxic mold because the
latter involve competing expert opinions regardinf the nature, cause,
and extent of the toxic mold contamination.
As indicated in
Prudential,in assessing the nature, cause, and extent issues, there are
"standard practices within the insurance industry."' 1 5 Also referenced
within the Prudentialopinion, is the assertion that failure to adhere to
these standard practices of investigation in the insurance industry may
result in the perpetuation of an existing and growing problem, such as
toxic mold. 1 6 Similarly, conclusions or possibilities based upon an
investigation that does not adhere to industry standards may warrant
1091d.

1'od.; see also Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 24-28; Lewis, 205 F. Supp. at 707.
"'See e.g., Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App. 2002).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 238. (stating, "[T]he Texas Supreme Court recognized several nonexclusive
factors enumerated by the court in Daubert to guide trial courts in acting as gatekeepers to
assess the reliability of scientific expert testimony: the extent to which the theory has been or
can be tested; the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the
expert; whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; the technique's
potential rate of error; whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted
as valid by the relevant scientific community; and the non-judicial uses which have been made
of the theory or technique.")
""Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at *34.
"'1d. at *5.
"16!d. An insurance expert hired by Lillard-Roberts suggested that Prudential's adjuster's
opinion regarding the cause, nature, and extent of damage may have been askew due to
Prudential's adjuster's failure to conduct an investigation of the roof of the Lillard-Robert's
home. Rather, the adjuster merely based his conclusions, deemed by him as "possibilities," on
a visual inspection conducted from the ground only.
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inquiry into whether each party has endeavored to fulfill their
agreement, as stipulated within the policy language.' 17 While toxic
mold has become an increasingly desperate issue only within the past
couple of years, it seems only prudent that insurance companies and
their adjusters take far-sighted and proactive steps to detect and/or
prevent any toxic mold problems.118
In cases such as Prudential, the insurer has taken a somewhat
minimalist investigative and fully offensive position.' 1 9 In light of this
growing problem, and the possibly devastating economic implications,
this reaction by insurance companies is understandable."? In fact,
many insurance companies have taken it a step further by completely
excluding recovery for mold damage from their policy coverage. 121 In
response, some states have specified that "[m]old cannot be excluded
from liability coverage ......
Courts and state legislatures alike, must evaluate whether they will
allow insurers to pass the unfortunate burden of proving irrefutable
toxic mold contamination onto their insured. Technically, in most
states, the law says yes; the insurance companies need only respond
when the insured has proven their case for coverage. 123 However,
perhaps it is necessary, in cases like Prudential,that courts take a more
diligent approach to evaluating the insurer's contribution to adequately
and accurately evaluating and insured's claim(s).124 If an insurer has
not made the painstaking, yet necessary, effort to fulfill its obligation to
the insured, perhaps costly procedures such as deconstructive testing
should be a shared responsibility. Or conversely, perhaps the toxic
mold property insurance catastrophe necessitates court appointed
adjusters to evaluate the claims so as to prevent the inevitable biases,
" 781d. at *6.
11 See Michalski, supra note 2.
9

" Prudential,2002 WL 31495830 at * 1, 5. Prudential seeks declaratory relief indicating
that Lillard-Robert's
policy does not cover the mold damage.
0
12 See Michalski, supra note 2.

121See Cheryl Powell, Toxic mold breeds lawsuits, BEACON J, Oct. 22, 2002, at
http://www.ohio.wm/mld/ohio/newa/local/4339878.htm (quoting Mitch Wilson, spokesman for
the Ohio Insurance Institute, "For at least 10 years, most insurers have excluded losses caused
by mold, except for when the mold is caused by a covered calamity, such as a burst water
pipe.").122
See Berry, supra note 101 (noting that Georgia does not allow mold to be excluded

from liability coverage).
123

See supra note 87.

,4See e.g., Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(finding that insurer owes insured duty of good faith and fair dealings, which includes the
insured's obligation to make reasonable investigation into facts surrounding the claim(s));
Cleveland v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 295 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that
negligent inspection by an insurance company presents a cause of action in tort.).
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real or presumed, which will complicate any resolution that may be
reached.
CONCLUSION
As an increasing number of states are realizing the implications of the
toxic mold insurance disputes, the courts continue to struggle with
discovering a workable method of resolving the inherent issues
involved in toxic mold cases. 125 As toxic mold litigation evolves, the
reliability standards required for expert testimony regarding the health
effects of toxic mold will be established. However, when the dispute
revolves around the cause of the toxic mold, and the court concludes
coverage resolution requires demolition of the insured's home, time
and reoccurrence will not provide a workable solution for all the parties
involved. 126 Discovering a solution to this issue requires that the
legislature and the judiciary act to set the boundaries and policy of
toxic mold insurance coverage and disputes, before toxic mold 1is
27
allowed to infest the inner workings of property insurance coverage.
Requiring that insured parties destroy their own homes in order to
ascertain any hope of insurance coverage does not create a workable
solution. Decisions such as Prudentialare communicating the wrong
message to the parties involved, and perhaps destroying the faith
insured parties have in the court's ability to hold property insurers
responsible for coverage. 128

125See e.g., Prudential,2002 WL 31495830; Centex-Rooney, 706 So. 2d at 24-28; Lewis,
205 F. Supp. 706 at 707.
126
See generally Prudential,2002 WL 31495830.
127See Berry, supra note 101.

12SPrudential,2002 WL 31495830; see also Appeals Court Cuts Verdict Against Insurer
Over Mold In Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at § A, at 29 (stating that in response to a case
involving toxic mold Dan Lambe, executive director of Texas Watch stated: "Unfortunately
this decision sends a message to insurance companies that says you will not be responsible if
you delay, deny, hassle, and mistreat Texas families or Texas claimants.").
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